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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to estimate the effect of minimum wage on the employment rate of young
individuals, taking into account potential nonlinearity. In a cross-country set-up of European countries,
we find a significant nonlinear relationship between minimum wages and the employment rate of young
individuals. While low minimum wages can indeed have positive effects on employment, after a certain
level of the minimum wage the employment effect turns to be negative. This implies that there is an
optimal level of minimum wages that maximizes the employment rate of young individuals.
We additionally show that the negative effect of minimum wages on employment of young workers
is stronger if labor markets are otherwise strictly regulated and when workers are relatively unpro-
ductive. Using these results, we are able to calculate country specific turning points and show that
some European countries in our sample might in fact contribute to high unemployment rates among
young individuals by setting minimum wages too high. While in other European countries, especially
in Eastern European countries, an increase in minimum wages (up to a certain level) might even lead
to higher employment rates of young individuals.
JEL Classification: J20, J38, J48
Keywords: minimum wage, employment, young workers, Europe
INTRODUCTION
Currently, about 90 percent of countries worldwide have statutory minimum wages in place (see
Herr and Kazandziska 2011). As such, the effects of minimum wages on employment are not only
theoretically, but also empirically one of the most vividly discussed topics concerning today’s labor
market policies.
While many studies have suggested that increases in the minimum wage negatively impact employ-
ment, other studies have suggested positive effects. Recent theoretical research has stated that there is
a positive effect of higher minimum wages on the supply side, while they have negative effects on the
demand side, which suggests that the effect might in fact be non-linear. That is, there is a positive effect
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of minimum wages on employment as long as they are low, but as minimum wages rise, the negative
effect will dominate the positive one.
In general, the employment effects of minimum wages should be especially strong for young indi-
viduals, since they are less experienced and therefore more likely to be affected by minimum wages. As
Gorry (2013) showed, the effects of minimum wage increases on (un)employment are nonlinear in age
and are especially high for young individuals with no experience. 2
Manning et al. (2016) recently stated: ”Of course there is some level of the minimum wage at which
employment will decline significantly. The literature should re-orient itself towards trying to find that
point.” This is exactly the aim of this paper. First, we estimate the effects of changes in the minimum
wage on the employment rate of young individuals in a selection of European countries, starting from
the hypothesis that this effect might be nonlinear. Second, we estimate the level of minimum wage, at
which the negative employment effect dominates the positive one, making the overall effect negative.
Third, we take a closer look on whether labor-market characteristics can influence this turning point.
Theoretical research by Brown et al. (2014b)3 serves as a baseline model for our predictions. This
reasearch showed that higher wages depress the “job offer rate”, while increasing the “job acceptance
rate”, since the value of work relative to unemployment increases. Therefore, the authors argue that
“under moderate minimum wages, the latter effect may dominate the former.” This is exactly the
possibility of a nonlinear relationship in which we are interested.4
Keeping this theoretical approach in mind, we estimate whether the employment effects of an
increase in the minimum wage might in fact be nonlinear, with increase from lower wages stimulating
employment, whereas this effect is reversed once the wage is set too high. To anticipate the main
results, we show that low minimum wages might induce employment for young individuals, while
indeed reducing their employment possibilities once minimum wages reach a certain level.
Additionally, we take a closer look at country-specific labor-market characteristics, such as produc-
tivity, hiring costs, and gross replacement rates for the unemployed. We show that those characteristics
significantly affect the turning point above which the employment effect of minimum wages turns neg-
ative.
While most empirical research has assumed there is a linear employment effect of minimum-wage
increases within countries that might differ in terms of their institutional labor-market settings and
2Gorry (2013) show in a dynamic general equilibrium framework that ”...the effects of a minimum wage are initially
large and die out over time as workers gain experience.”
3For a longer version of this work, please consult Brown et al. (2014a).
4Several other models have predicted that minimum wages have ambigous employment and welfare effects (e.g., Flinn
2006). Since in this work we abstract away from welfare considerations, we focus on the simplified framework of Brown
et al. (2014b).
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proportion of low-skilled and/or young workers, our analysis contributes to the discussion in several
ways. Firstly, we take supply-side effects of minimum wages into account, we directly estimating whether
the theoretically predicted nonlinear effects of minimum wages have evidence in the case of European
countries. Explicit analysis of a nonlinear relationship could explain not only insignificant, but also
heterogeneous results from previous work on the employment effects of minimum wages. Secondly,
we carefully approach and correct for potential endogeneity of the covariates, for which many studies
have not accounted. Finally, we estimate employment elasticities on a country–by–country basis, which
allows us to formulate policy recommendations. While in many European countries, especially in
Eastern Europe, minimum wages could be increased without harming employment rates of young
individuals, in some others, such as Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Ireland, minimum wages
already are above their turning point, indicating raises have a negative effect on the employment rates
of young individuals.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section I, we give a short overview of the literature. Section
II briefly presents the theoretical model and hypotheses for the empirical study. Section III presents
the empirical model and the data. Afterwards, the empirical findings and a robustness analysis are
discussed in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
I. LITERATURE OVERVIEW
There is a vast micro-data analysis of the effects of minimum wages on employment. Neumark
and Wascher (2006) broadly overviewed minimum wage studies which estimate employment effects.
However, even though a number of studies analyze cross-country time-series of the employment effects
of different labor-market policies, comparatively few works have focused specifically on the effect of
minimum wage.
The OECD (1998) analyzed minimum-wage effects on the employment of three specific groups:
teenagers, young adults, and prime-age adults. The authors used a panel of nine OECD countries be-
tween 1975 and 1996. The regression model followed the state-panel models used in the U.S. minimum-
wage literature (e.g., Burkhauser et al. 2000, Keil et al. 2001, Partridge and Partridge 1999). The
results showed that an increase in the minimum wage has a negative employment effect for the teenager
group in all specified models. For the other age groups, the effects were ambiguous.
Another study, from Neumark and Wascher (2004), combined the methodology of the OECD study
with some additional data on different labor-market institutions and policies that might influence
employment rates of young individuals, with a panel that includes 17 countries from 1976 until 2000.
For all specifications, the results for teenagers as well as for youth suggest that an increase in the
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minimum wage has a negative employment effect. Additionally, Neumark and Wascher (2004) estimate
the effects of bargaining and subminima for young employees. While bargained minimum wages and
youth subminima weaken the negative employment effect of a minimum-wage increase for teenagers
and youths, industry and geographic wage floors seem to strengthen the negative effects.
Addison and Ozturk (2010) used a panel of 16 OECD countries and looked at the period between
1970 and 2008. They estimated the employment effects of a minimum wage increase not for teenagers
and young adults but for female, prime-age workers. Their results were in line with the findings of
Neumark and Wascher (2004), suggesting a negative employment effect on prime-age women. Regarding
the stronger dis-employment effects in countries with the least-regulated labor markets, they did not
find empirical evidence for the target group.
Dolton and Bondibene (2011) re-estimated the results of Neumark and Wascher (2004) by using
panel data for 33 OECD countries from 1976 to 2008. The model they used is similar to that of Neumark
and Wascher (2004), except for additional controls for the aggregated labor-market situation. Their
results were in line with the findings of Neumark and Wascher (2004), suggesting that changes in the
minimum wage have a negative employment effect. As a robustness test, the authors suggested using a
weighted regression technique in order to control for differently sized labor markets by country. When
the authors used this estimation technique, they found that a minimum-wage increase had neither a
significant negative nor a significant positive employment effect. Most recently, for the European Union,
Laporsˇek (2013) found a negative effect of minimum wages on youth employment.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
Before we formulate our hypotheses, it is useful to explain in more detail the hypotheses stemming
from the theoretical work of Brown et al. (2014b). In this model, firms only offer a job if the idiosyncratic
variations in workers’ suitability for the jobs are sufficiently low. As a result, since the job-offer rate
in the steady state negatively depends on the equilibrium wage, an increase in the minimum wage will
reduce the “job-offer rate”, leading to lower employment. This is called the “job-offer effect” and can
be summarized by the formula
η = J
(
a− w
1− δ(1− σ) − h
)
, (1)
where J denotes the cumulative distribution of the job suitability shock, a is the average workers’
productivity, w is the equilibrium wage, δ is the time discount factor, h are the hiring costs, and σ is
the separation rate. It is easy to see that the job-offer effect should positively depend on the average
worker’s productivity and negatively on the wage level, as well as on hiring costs.
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On the other hand, some workers are willing to work for the new (higher) equilibrium wage, because
it is now above their reservation wages, so the job-acceptance rate increases. This leads to higher
employment. This is called the “job-acceptance effect,” given by
α = Je
(
w − b
1− δ(1− σ − µ)
)
, (2)
where Je is the cumulative distribution of the work effort disutility shock and b stands for the unem-
ployment benefit level. Clearly, job acceptance positively depends on the wage level and negatively
depends on the level of unemployment benefits b. The “job-acceptance effect” is limited at a certain
level, since the job-acceptance rate would reach 100 percent, with a sufficiently high minimum wage. 5.
The two effects countervail each other, and a non-linear, inverted U-shaped overall effect is predicted.
Figure 1 shows example shapes of the two effects given that job suitability and work effort disutility
are normally distributed.
Figure 1: Job-offer, job-acceptance, and the overall effect
The theoretical predictions of Brown et al. (2014b) also allow us to formulate hypotheses concerning
the signs of the effects of particular labor-market institutions on employment. As the job-acceptance
5Brown et al. (2014a): ”For lower labor-demand elasticities, the job acceptance effect is dominant for small minimum
wage increases. But after some moderate increase of the minimum wage, the job acceptance rate (which is calibrated to
71%) reaches its upper bound of 100%. Thus, the job acceptance effect is no longer at work and the job offer effect starts
dominating.
5
effect might dominate the job-offer effect for lower wages, and because the opposite might be true for
case with higher minimum wages, we expect the relationship between the level of the minimum wage
and employment rates of young individuals to have an inverted-U shape. Additional inspection of (1)
and (2) allows us to form hypotheses concerning how other labor-market characteristics affect employ-
ment, as well as concerning the interactions between hiring costs, unemployment benefits, and worker
productivity, and the minimum wage. We expect hiring costs, as well as unemployment benefits, to
decrease overall employment rates, whereas the worker productivity is expected to increase employment.
Additionally, the hiring costs, unemployment benefits, and average productivity change the strength
of the two countervailing effects. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the average productivity of workers
strengthens the job-offer effect; consequently the point at which the minimum-wage effect turns negative
should shift to the right. Similarly, both hiring costs (which reduce job offers) and unemployment
benefits (which reduce job acceptance) should shift the turning point to the left, towards lower minimum
wages. These predictions are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Predicted effects minimum wages and other labor market characteristics on the employment rates
of young individuals.
Variable Sign/Effect
Minimum Wage Inverted U
Hiring Costs Negative
Productivity Positive
Unemployment benefits Negative
Hiring Costs * Minimum Wage Negative (Shift left)
Productivity * Minimum Wage Positive (Shift right)
Unemployment Benefits * Minimum Wage Negative (Shift left)
III. DATA AND THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
III.I. Data
Our panel compraises data on 12 EU countries with statutory minimum wages over the period
1980-2011.6 To capture changes in the minimum wage, we first employ real annual minimum wages
(RAMW ) adjusted for purchasing power parity. As an additional measure for minimum wage, we use
the Kaitz index (MWAW ), which reflects the relationship between the level of the minimum wage and
the average wage and can be interpreted as the relative price of low-skilled and average-skilled labor.
We do not include countries with strict collective-bargaining systems for different economic sectors (e.g.,
Italy or Austria), as the Kaitz index is not available for these, and furthermore they might additionally
6The countries covered in our sample are Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the Nether-
lands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Estonia and Slovenia, which also have a statutory
minimum wage, had to be excluded for their lack of data on other labor market characteristics.
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bias the estimates. Summary statistics of the annual minimum wage and the Kaitz index are presented
in Table 7 in the Appendix. Moreover, Figure 8 in the Appendix presents the country-time variation of
both measures of the minimum wage. We can observe substantial variation within as well as between
the countries in terms of levels of the Kaitz index and real annual minimum wages. This variation
allows us to explore our research question.
The main source of the data is the OECD database. Labor force data, including average worker
productivity and replacement rates, were taken from the OECD Annual Labour Force Statistics, while
the real annual minimum wage and Kaitz index are taken from the OECD Minimum Wage Database.7
Labor market regulation data come from the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) database by
the Fraser Institute (Gwartney et al. 2014), and macroeconomic indicators are taken from the World
Economic Outlook (WEO) database. Additionally secondary-school enrollment (United Nations), con-
scription (EFW), recesssion (WEO), collective bargaining (World Economic Forum), and annual average
wages (OECD) are used as control variables.
Our sample is an unbalanced panel that includes 228 observations. The source for the unbalanced
panel arises from different implementation times of statutory minimum wages, not from the availability
of the data.8 The main variables used in the regressions are summarized in Tables 8 and 9 in the
Appendix. It could be hypothesized that introduction of a statutory minimum wage is not random
but is a result of, for example, economic developments, labor-market conditions, or political decisions.
In that case, the resulting attrition would be non-random and the fixed-effects estimator would be
inconsistent due to endogenous selection. We therefore test for this potential bias using a variant of
the Chamberlain-Mundlak approach to handling unobserved effects. Assume that the introduction of
the minimum wage follows
sit = 1[α + Xitβ + Xitγ + vit ≥ 0],∀t ∈ (1, . . . , T ), (3)
where sit is the existence of a statutory minimum wage and the covariates Xit are observed in all periods,
that is, also before the minimum wages had been introduced (Xit denotes the country averages). We
assume that the error term vit is normally distributed and run a pooled probit model. Xit contains
the control variables used later, as well as some additional economic indicators (e.g., the real GDP
growth rate). In the next step, we calculate the fitted probabilities and the inverse Mills ratios, denoted
λˆit, which are added as additional regressors to the fixed-effects estimations on the selected sample.
7The original OECD series does not consider the fact that France introduced a 35-hour workweek in 2000. We have
readjusted the series to this change. Additionally, the first observation for Ireland was erroneous in the original OECD
series and is therefore excluded from the sample.
8The start of our time series for the Kaitz index is highlighted in Table 7.
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Selection bias can be discarded, if λˆ is insignificant; if not, it can be corrected using the Chamberlain’s
procedure (see Chamberlain 1982).
III.II. The empirical model
The theoretical predictions suggest that the relationship between the minimum wage level and the
employment rates of young individuals might have an inverted-U shape. The baseline model is, therefore
Empi,t = α+ β ∗MWi,t−1 + γ ∗MW 2i,t−1 + δ ∗Hi,t + ζ ∗AWPi,t+
η ∗GRRi,t + Θ ∗Xi,t + τt + αi + εi,t, (4)
where Empi,t is the employment rate of young individuals at time t in country i, defined as employed
people aged 15 to 24 as a percentage of the total number of people in this age group. MWi,t−1
is the lagged minimum wage variable at time t − 1 in country i proxied first by the Kaitz index
(MWAW ) and second by real annual statutory minimum wage (RAMW ). Hi,t represents the hiring
costs measured by the strictness of labor-market regulations (EFW 5B index)9, which encompasses the
following components: whether fixed-term contracts are prohibited for permanent tasks, the maximum
cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts and the Global Competitiveness Report question: ”The
hiring and firing of workers is impeded by regulations”(Gwartney et al. 2014); AWP is the average labor
productivity measured as GDP per hour worked in country i at time t (at constant prices), GRR is
the gross replacement rate measuring the relative size of the unemployment benefits to the wage levels,
and X is a vector of the control variables. PRYi,t is the size of the young cohort (aged between 15 and
24 years) to the working-age population (aged between 15 and 64 years). Additionally, we include the
output gap as business cycle control variable10. Additionally we control for secondary school enrolment
(SchEn), the strength of collective wage bargaining (Bargaining) and the strength of conscription
regulations (Conscription) and we include a recession dummy (periods with negative growth of real
GDP).11 Finally, τt stands for the time effects and αi are country-specific fixed effects. Alternatively,
instead of time effects, we allow for country–specific trends.
The effects of a minimum wage, from a theoretical perspective, should take place after some delay,
since it takes time for employers to adjust factor inputs (low-skilled labor, high-skilled labor, and capital)
to a change in the factor prices (see Neumark and Wascher 1992, Baker et al. 1999). Additionally, the
9We have rescaled the index so that higher value, denote more regulation. Moreover, early observations in the Fraser
index are of poor quality due to lacking data; we have recalculated the index to account for the missing components.
10The use of other variables such as prime age employment rate or the unemployment rate as controls for the business
cycle did not change our results.
11Variables AWP , H, GRR, and control variables Bargaining and Conscription have all been Varimax rotated, thus
rescaled with mean equal to 0 and variance equal to 1.
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high level of employment protection in Europe would suggest the use of lagged minimum-wage variable,
since as Neumark and Wascher (2004) argued, “One might think that this adjustment process would
be even slower in European countries, where legal restrictions on dismissals are generally stricter than
in the United States.”
In order to further explore the size and strength of the effect of minimum wages on employment,
we additionally add interaction terms with the three other main variables, which, as explained in the
previous section, determine the job-offer and job-acceptance effects: (1) the average productivity of
workers, (2) hiring costs, and (3) the size of unemployment benefits. We then analyze the signs and the
strength of the marginal effects of minimum wages for different levels of the other variables of interest.
As mentioned above, one of the main concerns in any analysis of the impact of minimum wages
on employment rates of young individuals is potential endogeneity of the main independent variable:
that is, the minimum wage itself might be endogenous with respect to employment rates of young
individuals, as labor market policies might be introduced specifically to address the changes in labor-
market conditions. As Lemos (2005) argued, politicians might favor or oppose minimum wage increases
depending on a country’s overall macroeconomic performance. Yet, irrespective of politician’s reactions
to macroeconomic circumstances, changes in minimum wages can be explained by the ideology of
the politicians in power. Arguably, higher minimum wages are introduced by left-wing governments
irrespective of a country’s economic conditions. We base our identification strategy on this latter
observation (c.f. Saint-Paul 1996). Unlike Lemos (2005), however, we do not directly instrument for the
minimum wage with political variables, as the latter can be codetermined by economic circumstances,
i.e., e.g., voters in a country hit by high unemployment are likely to be unhappy about the performance
of the government, and might wish for a change. Similarly, using the electoral cycle might not be fully
exogenous, if early elections are called. Therefore, we instead propose a method, which accounts for
endogeneity of the political variables.
In the second set of regressions, we make use of the above observations, adopting an instrumenting
technique similar to Nunn and Qian (2014). In the first stage, we instrument the minimum wage in the
following way:
MWi,t = α + β ∗Oilpricei,t−1 + γ ∗Oilpricei,t−1 × Lefti + Θ ∗Xi,t + τt + αi + εi,t. (5)
Variable Oilprice is the average real crude oil import price per barrell in US dollars12. In this spec-
ification, Oilprice measures the oil price changes, which presumably affect the labor-market situation
12The nominal crude oil spot price from 2003 to 2011 is for Dubai and from 1970 to 2002 for Arabian Light.
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in country i (see, e.g., Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001), which in turn might encourage politicians to
introduce changes to the minimum wage regulations. Unlike Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), how-
ever, we do not measure exposure directly but simply use the oil price which is entirely exogenous. To
obtain country-year varation of the instrument, we follow the interaction approach by Nunn and Qian
(2014). The second term is an interaction between the oil price and the average left-wing orientation
of the government over the analyzed period. Data regarding the political orientation of cabinets are
provided by the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al. 2012) and include information on
the relative power position of social democratic and other left-wing parties in government based on
their seat shares in parliament, measured as a percentage of the total parliamentary seat shares of all
governing parties and weighted by the number of days in office in a given year. Given that changes
in government might be a reaction to changing economic circumstances, time-varying orientation of
the government is not exogenous. However, since we average out changes in government composition
over time, average orientation will be fully captured by the country fixed effects.13 The interaction
term itself varies by country and year, which allows us to control for time fixed effects. Conceptually,
instrumenting for the minimum wage in this way, compares changes in the minimum wages between
countries which are dominated by left-wing governments and countries which are right-wing-oriented,
following changes in world oil prices.
With this technique we can make sure that the causation does not run from the employment to the
minimum wage (via the changes in the government composition or its policy). Causal interpretation
using the interacted instrumental variable relies on an exclusion restriction that, conditional on other
labor-market characteristics, changes in the employment rates of young individuals following changes in
oil prices do not systematically differ between countries with left- and right-wing-oriented governments.
One potential channel could theoretically be the higher propensity of left-wing-oriented countries to
use renewable energy and therefore reduce oil consumption. In our sample, this does not seem to be
the case, as correlation between oil imports over GDP and left orientation is low, at 3.2% (p-value
of 0.60). Other channels, such as the general alignment of the labor markets, are captured either
through the variables describing the time-changing alignment of the labor markets, i.e., replacement
rates, collective bargaining and the hiring cost index, or by the country fixed effects14. Moreover, since
we directly analyze the interaction of minimum wages with other labor market characteristics, we can
capture a large part of the latter transmission channel.
13That is why, we also do not include the Lefti term in the regression.
14We cannot fully exclude the possibility that world economic developments, such as oil prices, affect the included labor
market policies. Yet, these are not the main focus of this paper, so instrumenting for them is overzealous.
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The first-stage estimates are then used to instrument the minimum wages and their squared values.
To avoid the “forbidden regression” problem, we proceed as follows: we derive the fitted values from
the first-stage estimations and generate squared values of those, which are subsequently, together with
the Oilpricei,t−1 and Oilpricei,t−1 × Lefti, used as instruments in the second stage15. That is, we
instrument MWi,t and MW
2
i,t with Oilpricei,t−1, Oilpricei,t−1×Lefti, and M̂W
2
i,t. The latter term adds
a nonlinear function of the exogenous variables to the instrument set. Similarly, interactions between
the minimum wage and other analyzed characteristics, are instrumented with an interaction between
the exogenous variables and the instrument. In all IV regressions, we use the Limited Information
Maximum Likelihood estimator (LIML), which performs better when the instruments are weak16. The
preference for the LIML estimator stems from two main reasons:
1. The LIML estimator has been shown to perform better if the sample size is small, as is ours
(see e.g. Anderson et al. 1982, Hahn and Inoue 2002). Various studies show that the the LIML
estimator approaches the asymptotic normal distribution much more rapidly than two–stage least
squares.
2. The LIML estimator is preferred to the 2SLS estimator whenever instruments are weak and the
use of the LIML estimator potentially eliminates the usual bias associated with the use of 2SLS
with weak instruments, even if the normality of the errors is violated (see e.g. Kunitomo and
Matsushita 2008).
Alternatively, we could use the control function approach to tackle the nonlinearity of the endogenous
variable (see, e.g., Wooldridge 2015). Control function is likely to be more efficient, but is less robust as
it requires more strict linearity assumptions. We report the control function estimates in the robustness
section.
It is helpful to understand the properties of our instruments by looking at the ”first–stage” esti-
mations, which can be found in Table 14 in the Appendix. Looking at the first column, we see that
an increase in the world oil price is associated with lower minimum wages. Conversely, an interacted
left orientation of the government shows a positive correlation, which means that when an oil price
shock is followed by an economic downturn and potentially lower minimum wages, this effect is weaker
in countries with left-oriented governments on average. On the other hand, the Kaitz index is not
strongly correlated with oil prices. This, in fact, further confirms that the instrument actually reflects
changes to the labor market: if the minimum wage were lowered as a result of an economic downturn,
15See Wooldridge (2010, pp. 262)
16The results of the LIML estimation are comparable with the 2SLS estimates, which can be obtained upon request.
11
this same downturn would cause the average wages in the economy to go down, so that in such a case
the Kaitz index itself would not change. On the other hand, a left-wing orientation of the government,
similarly to the annual minimum wage variable, reduces the negative effects of economic circumstances
on the minimum wage.
Regarding the strengh of the instruments, interpretation of the test results is not straightforward,
as the test statisticts of Kleibergen and Paap (2006) cannot be directly compared to the critical values
of Stock and Yogo (2005), which do not account for clustering of the standard errors. Nevertheless, we
report the results of the the maximal LIML bias test based on Stock and Yogo (2005). In most cases,
our instruments are associated with maximal bias of 10% for the case of the minimum wage variable,
and slightly higher for the real annual minimum wage.
Another methodological issue is that the employment rate of young individuals is an average of spe-
cific microdata regarding the employment of individuals. This might lead to problems in the estimation
methods (see, e.g., Baker et al. 1999) because the size of the labor markets differs across countries.
Essentially, if we do not weight the estimations, we explicitly assume that we should attach as much
weight to a small country, such as Estonia, as to a large country, such as France or the United Kingdom.
Dolton and Bondibene (2011) mentioned that the use of a weighted regression might be a solution to
this problem, specifically weighting by the number of raw data points that are used to calculate the
averages.17 As a robustness check, we add, therefore, estimates of regressions weighted by the sizes of
the labor markets, measured as the number of persons aged 15 to 64 in each country.
Additionally, we demonstrate the relationship between the current minimum wage and employment
rates of young individuals. Previous studies of the United States and Canada have suggested that the
employment effects of minimum wages take at least a year to be fully reflected in the data, presumably
because of the time it takes employers to adjust factor inputs to changes in factor prices (see, e.g.,
Neumark and Wascher 1992, Baker et al. 1999). One might think that this adjustment process would
be even slower in European countries, where legal restrictions on dismissals are generally stricter than in
the United States. We are convinced that the lagged specification corresponds better to rigid European
labor markets. Still in order to analyze the sensitivity of the results to this arbitrary assumption, we
reassess the result using current instead of lagging minimum wages.
Finally, since the sample size is relatively small, we need to make sure that the results are not driven
by outliers. We reestimate all equations, correcting for outliers. We identify the outliers based on the
17We weight the regressions with raw data points that are used to calculate the average (or the labor market size), but
we do not weight by the population of the country (Dolton and Bondibene 2011). Population might not be an appropriate
weight, since population size is not necessarily a good proxy for labor market size, because retirement age differs widely
across countries and, additionally, countries’ demographic structure are not the same.
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leverage statistic and the Cook distance. The leverage needs to be lower than 3k/N ' 0.73, while
Cook’s distance needs to be lower than 4/N ' 0.018. We drop those observations which do not satisfy
these requirements and reestimate the results.
A final robustness check would involve a dynamic specification, which could better capture short-run
developments in the labor market. (Un-)Employment rates in European countries tend to be persistent
due to, if nothing else, comparably high degree of unionization (see, e.g., Lindbeck and Snower 1987).
This means, that besides the effect of changes in the minimum wages on the employment rate of young
individuals, it is itself likely to be highly dependent on its past levels. In this robustness check, we want
account for this fact, and prove whether the identified effects still remain visible.
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
In this section, we present the main results concerning the effects of minimum wages on employment
of young workers. In the second subsection, we additionally analyze the interaction terms with other
variables of interest. Finally, the third subsection contains the weighted regressions and other robustness
checks. Since we use not only the real annual minimum wage but also the Kaitz index as dependent
variables, an important first step in this analysis involves evaluating whether the relationship between
the minimum and average wages is indeed positive and linear in order to rule out the possibility that
the non-linear effect works through the average wage channel.
Figure 2 visualizes the relationship between annual minimum and annual average wages for all
countries in the sample, showing, the between-country effect. Figure 2 shows a strong, positive, and
linear relationship between annual minimum and annual average wages. A slighly weaker relationship
can be observed only for the case of the Netherlands, where the average wage increased over the whole
period while the minimum wage remained relatively constant.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the demeaned mininum and average wages, that is each data
point corresponds to the difference between the minimum (average) wage and the country mean over
the whole period. This representation may be directly interpretated in light of the fixed-effects model,
as will be estimated. A clear linear relationship between the demeaned minimum and average wages
indicates that the non-linearity does not enter through the within-country, non-linear relationship,
strongly suggesting that our results are not driven by underlying nonlinearities.
13
Figure 2: Relationship between average and minimum wages in our sample
Figure 3: Relationship between demeaned average and minimum wages in our sample.
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IV.I. Main findings
Table 2 presents different specifications, both controlling for time effects and allowing for country-
specific trends.18 As a dependent variable, the Kaitz index may suffer from potential endogeneity, since,
as Card et al. (1993) highlighted, high average wages are often accompanied by high employment, which
would result in a negative bias of the estimates. Despite controlling for general employment trends,
in order to further rule out the possibility that the results are driven by the denominator of the Kaitz
index, we reestimate all equations, taking as a dependent variable the level of the annual statutory
minimum wage. We use both the Kaitz index –(in Columns (1) and (2)) – and the annual statutory
minimum wage – (in Columns (3) and (4)) – as variables measuring the minimum wage level. The
elasticities are evaluated at the averages.
Table 2 reveals a nonlinear relationship between the minimum wage and employment for young
workers. At lower levels of the minimum wage, the predicted level of employment rises along with the
wage level; beyond a turning point, the relationship inverses, with additional increases in the minimum
wages having a detrimental effect on employment rates of young individuals. This result is consistent
with the theory of Brown et al. (2014b). Using these estimates, we can calculate the effects of a change
in minimum wages on predicted employment at each value of the minimum wage. These results are
visualized in Figure 4,19 which presents the relationship between minimum wages and the predicted
employment rates of young individuals. In other words, the slope of the curve at each point represents
the marginal effect of a change in the minimum wage on employment rates of young individuals. Please
note that, in all specifications presented in Tables 2, λˆ is insignificant, which leads us to conclude that
there are no reasons to believe that sample selection has meaningfully biased the estimates.
Reflecting the regression coefficients, predicted employment shown in Figure 4 changes nonlinearly
along with minimum wages. The turning points of the nonlinerity are summarized in Table 3.
As expected, given that both the minimum wages and the employment rates of young individuals
are jointly determined, the OLS regression underestimates (the absolute value of) both the linear and
the squared coefficients. Consequently, the predicted relationship is steeper when we consider the IV
estimation (blue line). Moreover, the turning point in the IV case is shifted to the right, which means
that although both the positive relationship at lower levels of the minimum wage and the negative
relationship at higher levels are underestimated, the bias of the positive linear term is larger.
18The importance of including country-specific trends has been stressed by Addison et al. (2012), Allegretto et al.
(2011), and Dube et al. (2010), who show that including such trends greatly impacts the estimated results. Although,
on the other hand, Meer and West (2013) argued that controlling for trends can bias the results, it is important to
understand the sensitivity of the coefficients to this component’s inclusion.
19For better readibility of the figure, the confidence intervals of the predictions have been suppressed.
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Table 2: Employment rates of young individuals - basic results (Columns (1)-(4)) and the IV specification
(Columns (5)-(8))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lagMWAW 1.91∗∗ 1.73∗∗ 6.02∗∗∗ 9.50∗∗
(2.39) (2.36) (4.41) (2.50)
lagMWAW × lagMWAW -2.40∗∗∗ -2.59∗∗∗ -6.20∗∗∗ -9.81∗∗
(-2.60) (-2.71) (-5.22) (-2.56)
lagRAMW 0.37∗∗∗ 0.18∗ 1.30∗ 1.30
(5.16) (1.90) (1.93) (1.47)
lagRAMW × lagRAMW -0.12∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.37
(-5.69) (-2.97) (-2.96) (-1.56)
AWP -0.00 -0.02∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.00 0.05 -0.09∗ -0.06∗∗
(-0.49) (-2.28) (-7.14) (-2.66) (-0.04) (1.18) (-1.80) (-2.47)
H 0.00 -0.03 -0.00 -0.03∗ 0.03∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.01 -0.02
(0.48) (-1.47) (-0.24) (-1.77) (1.86) (-2.05) (-0.98) (-1.21)
GRR -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.03∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(-3.64) (-3.80) (-5.85) (-1.88) (-6.02) (-2.14) (-4.47) (-2.63)
Conscription 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01∗ -0.02 -0.03∗∗ -0.02 0.02
(0.03) (-1.45) (-0.30) (-1.67) (-1.29) (-2.12) (-1.17) (1.13)
Bargaining 0.02∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 0.02∗ -0.00 0.02 0.01
(2.29) (1.40) (2.71) (0.49) (1.80) (-0.03) (1.19) (0.73)
PRY 0.38 -0.41 0.69∗ -0.01 0.01 0.28 0.51 1.82
(1.07) (-1.10) (1.69) (-0.01) (0.02) (0.70) (1.23) (1.09)
Recession 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.66) (-0.80) (1.53) (-0.59) (-0.25) (-0.35) (-0.56) (0.06)
Output Gap 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01∗ 0.00∗∗ -0.00 -0.00
(0.09) (0.43) (-0.30) (0.58) (1.87) (2.16) (-0.82) (-0.78)
Secondary School -0.00∗ -0.00 -0.00 -0.00∗ -0.00 -0.00∗∗ -0.00 -0.00
(-1.88) (-1.09) (-0.63) (-1.72) (-1.43) (-2.42) (-1.35) (-1.09)
Constant -1.20∗∗∗ -0.56∗∗ -1.03∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗ -2.08∗∗∗ -2.55∗∗∗ -2.26∗∗ -2.05∗
(-4.89) (-2.44) (-7.13) (-2.02) (-5.79) (-2.74) (-2.30) (-1.75)
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time effects YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Country Trend NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
λˆ p-val 0.98 0.12 0.45 0.15 0.44 0.55 0.66 0.56
Elasticity -0.10 -0.23 -0.15 -0.28
Elasticity S.E. (0.16) (0.17) (0.13) (0.11)
Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228
K-P Wald F 7.71 4.28 2.08 1.81
Maximal LIML Bias <10% <15% >25% >25%
Sargan’s χ2 p-val 0.22 0.13 0.06 0.99
Shea’s Partial R2 0.37 0.32 0.11 0.29
Huber/White/sandwich standard errors clustered at country level, t-Stats in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01;
the reported Kleibergen and Paap (2006) first-stage statistics consider the clustering of the errors; the maximal LIML bias test is
based on Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values.
Figure 4: Effects of minimum wages on predicted employment rates of young individuals – Kaitz index (left
panel) and annual wage (right panel)
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Table 3: Turning points of the employment rate of young individuals in different specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Kaitz YE Kaitz trends RAMW YE RAMW trends
OLS 0.39 0.35 1.57 1.27
IV 0.48 0.44 1.85 1.50
The reservation wage plays an important role in the job-acceptance decision. If the offered wage
is below the reservation wage, the person decides to stay outside the job market; if it is above, then
the person prefers to participate in the job market, accepting the job offer. The reservation wage is
influenced by individual preferences (e.g., work vs. leisure, financial dependence), labor-market policies
(e.g., unemployment benefits, minimum wage), and outside options (e.g., education, retirement).
Young workers differ in their job-acceptance cutoffs from older generations. Young cohort members
are often not eligible for unemployment benefits, are likelier to tolerate unemployment,20 and have
more outside options than prime-age workers (e.g., can stay longer in education). Moreover, younger
workers have a higher probability of receiving a job offer than do older workers (Addison et al. 2004).
Nevertheless, since they are in much higher proportion less skilled and have lower wages, an increase in
the minimum wage makes employment more attractive to younger workers than to other age groups.
Higher minimum wages increase job-acceptance probability, resulting in higher employment. This
positive employment effect is counteracted by the negative job-offer effect, as firms facing increased
costs for salaries will no longer offer less productive jobs. At low levels of the minimum wage, the
job-acceptance effect dominates the job-offer effect, resulting in a positive employment effect.
We find that for the young age group, the turning point is on average attained for a real annual
minimum wage of $15700 (PPP) or at a respective Kaitz index of 0.39. After this threshold, additional
increases in the Kaitz index decrease employment. The average real minimum wage is in fact slightly
above this turning point, at $15700 (PPP) or a Kaitz index of on average 0.405. On average, in both
specifications we would expect a decrease in the employment rate of young individuals if the minimum
wage variable increased, notwithstanding the fact that this might not hold true for specific countries.
For all specifications, the estimated average elasticity of employment rates of young individuals
with respect to the minimum wage is between -0.15 and -0.28, depending on the specification, and the
elasticity of employment to changes in the Kaitz index is estimated between -0.10 and -0.23.21. These
figures correspond to the previous results for young workers surveyed in Brown (1999) The results here
20Cosar (2010): ”They have a lower discount rate, which makes them more willing to tolerate unemployment and
search for productive matches. On the other hand they forgo learning when unemployed.”
21Values together with the standard errors are listed in Table 2.
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estimate the elasticity of youth employment with respect to the minimum wage between -0.07 and
-0.41.22 It is important to note, however, that previous studies have estimated a linear relationship;
the average elasticity estimated here should remain the same compared to previous studies, as the
average elasticity of a non-linear relationship would equal the point elasticity at the average wage
for the linear estimate. That said, a linear relationship does accurately approximate either part of
the non-linear curve. For instance, if we look only at the negatively sloped part of the curve, the
linear approximation underestimates the negative effects of minimum wages on employment above the
turning point. Moreover, the IV results suggest that the actual turning point lies much more to the
right compared to the OLS estimations, implying on average positive elasticities (although insignificant
in all specifications).
Hence, it is interesting to see the development of the average point elasticity of employment with
respect to minimum wage changes for different reference ranges over the average annual statutory
minimum wage of $15700 (PPP). Table 4 highlights the results, which are in line with those previously
indicated in the literature.
Table 4: Average point elasticity in the reference ranges below and above the average annual staturory
minimum wage
Reference range -2000USD -1000USD +1000USD +2000USD
Elasticity RAMW 0.106 0.068 -0.070 -0.130
Elasticity MWAW 0.110 0.065 -0.092 -0.155
Still, these are average elasticities; and they can vary for different countries, as we will show in a
later subsection.
IV.II. Interaction of minimum wages with other labor-market characteristics
In this subsection, we look more closely at how country-specific labor-market characteristics, such
as productivity, hiring costs, and the gross replacement rate for unemployed may alter the employment
effects of minimum wages.
Tables 5 and 10 (in the Appendix) present the results of the interaction between the level of the
minimum wage and workers’ productivity, labor-market regulations, and unemployment replacement
rates for the young workforce. The effect of the interaction between average productivity and the
minimum wage has a positive sign, indicating that higher productivity shifts the turning point up,
22Neumark and Wascher (2004) estimate for OECD countries the elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum
wage for teenage workers (15–19 years old) between -0.18 and -0.24 and for youth workers between -0.13 and -0.16.
Similarly, OECD (1998) estimate the elasticities for teenage workers (15–19 years old) between -0.07 and -0.41 and for
young adults (20–24 years old) between -0.03 and -0.1.
18
since generally higher productivity of workers allows firms to pay higher wages without decreasing job
offers.
The coefficient of the interaction between minimum wages and hiring costs is negative, indicating
that an increase in hiring costs would lower the turning point of the minimum wage. An increase in
general hiring costs would strengthen the negative job offer effect and would result in a shift to the left
of the turning point.
The coefficient of the interaction between minimum wages and the gross replacement rate for un-
employed persons is insignificant in most of the specifications, indicating that the effect of the net
replacement rate does not affect the job-acceptance rate. One reason could be that young workers are
often not eligible for unemployment benefits.
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When adding the interaction term with the squared minimum wage variable (see Tables 16 and 17
in the Appendix), we can see that it is significant in most specifications. This indicates, that not only
does the non-linear relation shifts for different levels of productivity, hiring costs, or replacement rates,
but also that the curvilinearity between the employment rate of young individuals and the minimum
wage is influenced by labor-market institutions.
Marginal effects of minimum wages for different values of AWP and H are presented in Figure 5,
which reveals that the negative effect of minimum wages is particularly important when average worker
productivity is low. By contrast once productivity increases, the effect turns positive. This empirical
finding is again consistent with the theoretical prediction regarding the role of productivity on job
offers. From (1), it follows that when a is high compared to the equilibrium wage, job offers might not
disappear so easily. Finally, Figure 5 reveals that the negative effect of minimum wages on employment
is particularly relevant whenever the job market is strongly regulated, a result which is consistent with
our theoretical model. Our results suggest, that when overall level of regulation is low, the additional
effect of the minimum wage becomes insignificant.
As mentioned above, in the next step, we allow the curvilinearity to change. Figure 6 shows that the
curvilinearity is especially strong, if productivity (AWP) is low. On the other hand, when productivity
is high, the curvilinearity almost disappears. This indicates that if workers are very productive, the
negative job-offer effect might not be at work at all for low levels of minimum wages; employment
might indeed increase at higher minimum-wage levels, because the positive job-acceptance effect simply
dominates the negative but weak job-offer effect.
This also holds true for hiring costs. When hiring costs are high, the curvilinear relation becomes
steeper, indicating that the negative effects of higher minimum wages are more pronounced when hiring
costs are already high. This finding contrasts the findings of Neumark and Wascher (2004). They find
that the disemployment effects of minimum wages are strongest in the countries with the least regulated
labor markets.
To summarize these findings: productivity and hiring costs significantly influence the negative job-
offer effect: a high minimum-wage level in combination with low productivity or high hiring costs
strengthens the negative job-offer effect.
21
Figure 5: Marginal effects of minimum wages on employment rates of young individuals at levels of H and
AWP: Kaitz index (top) and annual wage (bottom)
Figure 6: Effects of minimum wages on Employment at levels of H and AWP: Kaitz Index
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IV.III. Country-specific turning points
In this chapter, we compare the predicted turning points for the young workforce with the actual
minimum wages for European countries, taking into account the joint effect of the minimum wage
with other labor-market characteristics. To estimate the turning points, we use a specification with
all three interaction terms for other labor-market characteristics (results can be found in Table 15 in
the Appendix). The country-time differences in the turning points stem, therefore, from the impact of
hiring costs, worker productivity, and replacement rates. The observed slight increase in the turning
points over time is mainly due to increasing levels of productivity.
We calculate country-specific turning points for the OLS estimation, as well as the IV estimation (see
Table 15). As already mentioned, the OLS estimator might be biased due to endogeneity problems. We
try to overcome those problems with an instrumental variable approach, which should result in unbiased
estimates. Though we show both the OLS and the IV estimates, we believe that the IV estimate is the
better one.
It seems that the turning points of the OLS and IV estimators converge over time perhaps because
our instrument is based on the idea that the minimum wage is a political instrument. Therefore
we conclude that the longer a minimum wage is implemented, the weaker the political influence on
minimum-wage setting becomes. Greece seems to be the only exception in this regard.
Figure 7 shows that in six of the countries in our sample - namely Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland,
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom – minimum wages are at present higher than the OLS as well as
the IV turning points, suggesting that the levels of the minimum wage in those countries is high enough
to harm the employment rate of young individuals. The difference between the minimum wage and
the turning point is quite small in Greece and the UK (and within the 95 percent confidence interval),
indicating that those countries have close to the optimal value of the minimum wage. In Belgium,
France, Ireland, and the Netherlands, there is a significant difference between the minimum wage and
the turning point, indicating that a reduction in the minimum wage would increase youth employment.
In the Netherlands, we observe a rise in the turning point until 2000 alongside a decrease in the
minimum wage. Still, both the IV and the OLS estimations of the turning point are lower than the
actual minimum wage in the Netherlands. This is mainly driven by the high minimum wage in the
Netherlands, not by low productivity or other labor- market characteristics.
In Belgium, an increase in productivity, stable development of the gross replacement rate, and a
decrease in hiring costs led to an increase of the turning point over the last 20 years in both the IV and
OLS estimations. Still, the actual minimum wage lies above the optimal level that would maximize
youth unemployment.
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In France, the turning point shows a slight upward trend since 1995, due to a slight increase in
productivity alongside a slight decrease in hiring costs. Still, the minimum wage has increased over
time. In the early 2000s, minimum wages for the first time were raised above the optimal level (IV
estimate), and they still today remain above that level.
In Ireland, the turning point is high, close to $20.000 (PPP) due to generally high productivity,
but there has been almost no improvement over time, while minimum wages rose steadily. Therefore,
minimum wages in Ireland have been above the turning points (IV and OLS estimators) since 2005.
In the four countries mentioned above, decreasing the minimum wage would be expected to increase
the employment rate of young individuals. For all other countries, our results suggest different policy
recommendations.
In the UK, as well as in Greece, the actual minimum wage is above both the IV and the OLS
estimates (but still within the 95 percent confidence interval). In Greece, there is a decrease in both
the IV and the OLS turning points over time due to increasing hiring costs and poor development of
productivity, especially in recent years. In the UK, productivity and hiring costs increased after 2000,
while productivity stabilized. The close distance of the minimum wage to the turning point suggests
that the actual minimum wage is indeed close to its optimal value, suggesting that either an increase
or a decrease in the minimum wage level would result in employment losses. (A slight decrease might
still lead to an increase in youth employment.) The case of the UK is particularly interesting, since
the government sets the minimum wage in accordance with the low pay commission (LPC), which is a
group of experts that advises the government for those concerns. This model for setting minimum-wage
levels seems to result in good employment outcomes.
Especially in, suggesting Eastern European countries, there seems to be room to increase minimum
wages without harming the employment of young workers – or potentially even stimulating it. The
same holds true for Portugal and Spain. In those countries, either low replacement rates (e.g., in the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland) or high productivity relative to the wage level lead to high
turning points, therefore suggesting that employment of young workers could be further stimulated by
an increase in the minimum wage. This result is also driven by the generally low minimum wages in
those countries.
In Spain, the distance to the optimal value is smaller compared to the Eastern European countries,
suggesting that there is only room for a slight increase of the minimum wage, without harming the
employment rate of young individuals.
Additionally, due to the non-linearity in the employment effects of minimum wages, we know that
the negative employment effects are higher for those countries that are above and further away from the
25
Table 6: Necessary increase/decrease of the minimum wage to reach the turning point in 2011 (in percent)
IV OLS
Belgium -19.7 -18.9
Czech Republic 111.2 112.5
France -19.4 -19.9
Greece -43.0 -11.4
Hungary 116.2 114.8
Ireland -19.1 -16.9
Netherlands -28.5 -28.1
Poland 67.6 69.7
Portugal 35.2 35.2
Slovakia 97.4 98.6
Spain 13.9 13.2
United Kingdom -6.0 -4.5
optimal level (turning point) than for those countries that are closer to the turning point. The negative
effects on youth employment of an increase in the minimum wage would therefore be especially high in
the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, and France.
On the other hand, we would expect a positive effect on youth employment of an increase in minimum
wages for some countries, an effect which would be especially strong in the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and Slovakia.
Table 6 looks more closely at the level of the minimum wage that maximizes the employment rate
of young individuals (turning point) in 2011.
Countries like Hungary or the Czech Republic could more than double the minimum wage without
negatively impacting the employment rates of young individuals. In Slovakia the minimum wage could
be increased by almost 100 percent. In Poland, an increase by approximately 70 percent, in Portugal an
increase by 35 percent, and in Spain an increase by 13 percent would be beneficial for youth employment.
In all other countries, a decrease of the minimum wage would increase the employment rate of
young individuals according to our model. Especially in the Netherlands (-28 percent), France (-20
percent), and Belgium (-19 percent), our model predicts higher employment rates of young individuals
after lowering the minimum wage, as Table 6 shows.
IV.IV. Robustness analysis
The first robustness check involves weighting the countries by the sizes of their respective labor
markets. The size of the labor market is the number of persons of working age (15 to 64 years). The
results are presented in Table 11 in the Appendix. We find that weighting the regressions in this way
does not change the main conclusions. The nonlinearity of the effect of the minimum wage remains
visible, although at slightly lower significance levels for the Kaitz index. Interestingly, the results of
the weighted regressions suggest that the effect of collective bargaining on employment is significant:
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it induces young employment. These interesting preliminary observations require further study.
We additionally examine the relationship between the current minimum wage and employment
rates of young individuals. Though we are convinced that the lagged specification corresponds to rigid
European labor markets, in order to analyze the sensitivity of the results to this somewhat arbitrary
assumption, we present in Table 12 in the Appendix the current specification. Coefficients and standard
errors remain similar, and the evaluated elasticities have slighly lower values on average. This result
suggests, that although theoretically the effects of changes in the minimum wage should take some
time to be fully reflected, we can observe a non-linear relationship in the model between the minimum
wage and employment rates of young individuals beginning in the same year. This is partly due to
introducing labor-market characteristics into the regressions.
Since the sample size is relatively small, we need to make sure that the results are not driven by
outliers. We re-estimate all equations, correcting for outliers identified based on the leverage statistic
and the Cook distance. The leverage needs to be lower than 3k/N ' 0.73 and the Cook’s distance needs
to be lower than 4/N ' 0.018. Dropping those observations which do not satisfy these requirements
and reassessing the results affects none of the main conclusions.
We test a dynamic specification. We estimate the main specification considering lagged employment
as an explanatory variable using a robust two-step system GMM estimator. In the level equation, we use
the time effects and use the lagged output gap as IV-type instruments and the lagged employment rate
of young individuals as a GMM-type instrument; in the first-differenced equation, lagged differences in
youth employment are used as GMM-type instruments. The GMM instruments have been collapsed,
which greatly reduces the total number of instruments, thus reducing the bias, which would otherwise
be significant given the small sample size. Results of this estimation are presented in Table 13 in the
Appendix, which also reports additional information regarding the number of instruments and test
statistics. The main conclusions remain unchanged.
Our instruments might partially be associated with the bias of about 10% compared to the OLS
estimator, in particular for the case of the real annual minimum wage variable. We check, therefore,
the robustness of our results using the control function approach instead. Table 18 in the Appendix
reports the estimates of the control function approach. The results remain similar and further confirm,
that the general conclusion regarding the nonlinear effect of minimum wages on the employment rates
of young individuals remains valid. We also test an alternative instrumental-variables specification, in
which we replace the mean orientation of the government with the year of the electoral cycle in each
country. Similarly to Lemos (2005), we find that minimum wages tend to rise in the election years.
The results are reported in Table 19 in the Appendix and further confirm the main findings, although
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in this case the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) statistics suggest that these estimates could be biased23.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The goal of this paper was to estimate the sensitivity of employment to changes in minimum wages
for young workers. The paper was inspired by the theoretical model of Brown et al. (2014b), which
suggests that the employment effects of a minimum wage are positive if the minimum wage is sufficiently
low.
Our results contribute to the discussion of the effects of minimum wages on employment, which
previous studies have reported to have a detrimental effect, particularly for the young workforce. The
presented results suggest that at low levels minimum wages have in fact a positive effect, as they
stimulate job-acceptance rates. On the other hand, high minimum wages decrease the demand for labor
and destroy employment possibilities. Moreover, we show that the minimum-wage effect is conditional
on other labor-market characteristics, especially on the levels of workers productivity and labor-market
regulations. The detrimental effects of high minimum wages are particularly strong if accompanied by
low productivity and/or by comparatively strict labor-market regulations.
Our results suggest considering with caution some previous estimates of the elasticity of employment
with respect to minimum wages. Barely negative or insignificant results can come as a result of averaging
the estimates over two groups of countries: those with comparatively low minimum wages, for which
we here expect an increase in the minimum wage to generate positive employment effects, and those
with high minimum wages. Since the employment effects differ substantially between these two groups,
a simple averaged elasticity cannot fully capture them.
Using these results, we are able to show that some European countries in our sample might in fact
contribute to high unemployment rates among young individuals by setting minimum wages too high,
as is the case in Belgium, France, Greece, and the Netherlands. However, in Spain, the UK, and Ireland,
actual minimum wages are very close to the turning point where the negative effect of a rise in the
minimum wage dominates the positive effect, suggesting that a further increase in the minimum wage
could reduce employment rates in the young workforce. On the other hand, in countries which either
have relatively deregulated labor markets and/or highly productive workers, higher minimum wages
should not have a detrimental effect on employment. Especially in Eastern European countries, there
seems to be room to increase minimum wages without harming the employment of young workers; indeed
doing so may potentially even stimulate it. As a general recommendation, we conclude that policy
23We have tested alternative specifications, e.g., instrumenting directly for the minimum wage with the left orientation
of the government replicating Lemos (2005), and the results remain similar. Full results can be obtained upon request.
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makers should formulate minimum-wage policy in accordance with local circumstances, in particular
by closely considering the characteristics of local labor markets.
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APPENDIX
Table 7: Descriptive statistics of the Kaitz index and Real Annual Minimum Wage (in $10000 (PPP))
Country Variable Mean SD Min Max
Belgium Kaitz index 0.47 0.02 0.43 0.49
(1983) Minimum Wage 2.16 0.06 2.01 2.28
Czech Republic Kaitz Index 0.28 0.05 0.20 0.34
(1993) Minimum Wage 0.61 0.18 0.35 0.84
France Kaitz Index 0.44 0.03 0.37 0.48
(1983) Minimum Wage 1.79 0.16 1.44 2.06
Greece Kaitz Index 0.40 0.06 0.31 0.49
(1983) Minimum Wage 1.26 0.10 1.13 1.45
Hungary Kaitz Index 0.34 0.04 0.28 0.42
(1992) Minimum Wage 0.60 0.15 0.41 0.79
Ireland Kaitz Index 0.44 0.01 0.43 0.46
(2001) Minimum Wage 2.04 0.16 1.83 2.25
Netherlands Kaitz Index 0.48 0.06 0.41 0.59
(1971) Minimum Wage 2.42 0.14 2.25 2.81
Poland Kaitz Index 0.35 0.06 0.14 0.43
(1992) Minimum Wage 0.66 0.17 0.43 0.95
Portugal Kaitz Index 0.38 0.03 0.34 0.42
(1975) Minimum Wage 1.00 0.08 0.85 1.21
Slovakia Kaitz Index 0.35 0.05 0.27 0.48
(1994) Minimum Wage 0.61 0.11 0.47 0.80
Spain Kaitz Index 0.37 0.03 0.33 0.45
(1972) Minimum Wage 1.30 0.06 1.20 1.41
United Kingdom Kaitz Index 0.36 0.02 0.33 0.38
(1999) Minimum Wage 1.78 0.17 1.46 1.95
Total Kaitz Index 0.39 0.07 0.14 0.59
Minimum Wage 1.34 0.64 0.27 2.81
Table 8: Description of the explanatory and instrumental variables
PRY Cohort size aged 15–24 (OECD)
Output Gap Output gap in percent of potential GDP (WEO)
Oil Price Crude oil import prices (IEA)
GRR Gross replacement rates (OECD)
AWP GDP per hours worked, constant prices (OECD)
H Labor-market regulations EFW B (higher value = more regulation)
SchEn Gross Secondary School Enrollment (UN)
Conscription World Survey of Conscription and Conscientious Objection to Military Ser-
vice, EFW Index
Bargaining Global Competitiveness Report question: Wages in your country are set by
a centralized bargaining process (= 1) or are up to each individual company
(= 7)
Left2 Relative power position of social democratic and other left parties in govern-
ment based on their seat share in parliament (CPDS I and III)
Recession Equals 1 in periods with negative growth of real GDP (WEO)
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Table 9: Means of the variables by country
Country EmpYoung PRY EmpMid AWP Hiring GRR Bargaining Conscription
Belgium 0.29 0.20 0.74 -0.02 0.33 0.90 -0.90 0.33
Czech Republic 0.35 0.21 0.83 0.25 -0.75 -1.42 1.10 -0.09
France 0.31 0.20 0.79 -0.14 0.75 0.72 -0.19 0.05
Greece 0.27 0.19 0.70 0.07 1.03 -1.06 -0.97 -1.27
Hungary 0.27 0.20 0.73 0.00 -0.46 -1.14 0.75 0.05
Ireland 0.42 0.26 0.67 -0.73 -1.04 0.50 -0.43 1.04
Netherlands 0.56 0.21 0.75 0.10 0.59 1.40 -0.81 -0.15
Poland 0.25 0.21 0.73 0.16 -0.20 -1.11 0.89 -0.58
Portugal 0.43 0.22 0.78 0.04 0.46 0.63 -0.08 -0.49
Slovakia 0.29 0.23 0.77 0.42 -0.54 -1.19 1.37 -0.10
Spain 0.35 0.21 0.64 0.45 0.62 0.48 -0.19 -0.24
United Kingdom 0.60 0.19 0.78 -0.23 -1.50 -0.79 1.08 1.04
Total 0.38 0.21 0.75 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
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Table 11: Basic specification: weighted regressions (Columns (1)-(4)) and outlier correction (Columns (5)-(8))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lagMWAW 1.98∗ 1.95∗ 2.30∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗
(1.86) (1.93) (2.71) (2.89)
lagMWAW × lagMWAW -2.49∗∗ -2.67∗ -3.06∗∗∗ -2.68∗∗∗
(-1.97) (-1.95) (-2.98) (-3.24)
lagRAMW 0.35∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(3.26) (3.38) (8.60) (3.34)
lagRAMW × lagRAMW -0.12∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗
(-4.37) (-4.35) (-11.20) (-4.84)
AWP 0.00 -0.01 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.01 -0.02∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
(0.26) (-0.75) (-4.90) (-2.13) (-0.87) (-1.78) (-22.57) (-4.65)
H -0.01 -0.05∗∗ -0.01 -0.05∗∗ 0.01 -0.03 -0.00 -0.03∗∗
(-0.92) (-2.32) (-1.09) (-2.20) (0.70) (-1.57) (-0.48) (-2.01)
GRR -0.03∗ -0.03∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(-1.95) (-1.79) (-3.94) (-1.99) (-3.11) (-3.56) (-8.15) (-4.05)
PRY 0.33 -0.11 0.95∗∗∗ 0.37 0.50∗∗ 0.04 0.99∗∗∗ 0.53∗
(1.30) (-0.38) (3.69) (0.89) (2.10) (0.25) (4.28) (1.71)
Secondary School -0.00 -0.00∗∗ -0.00 -0.00∗ -0.00 -0.00∗∗ 0.00 -0.00∗
(-0.89) (-1.97) (-0.54) (-1.66) (-0.16) (-2.24) (0.26) (-1.90)
Conscription -0.01 -0.02∗ -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01∗ 0.00 -0.01
(-1.40) (-1.82) (-0.54) (-1.44) (0.93) (-1.73) (0.30) (-1.29)
Bargaining 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01
(4.48) (2.26) (5.08) (2.13) (3.10) (1.67) (4.26) (1.53)
Recession 0.00 0.00 0.01∗ 0.00
(0.68) (0.10) (1.69) (0.11)
Output Gap 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.35) (0.78) (0.05) (0.36) (1.40) (1.34) (2.95) (1.60)
Constant -1.17∗∗∗ -0.70∗∗∗ -1.01∗∗∗ -0.77∗∗∗ -1.20∗∗∗ -0.70∗∗∗ -1.03∗∗∗ -0.76∗∗∗
(-4.39) (-2.88) (-5.60) (-3.31) (-6.38) (-4.24) (-15.26) (-3.87)
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time effects YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Country Trend NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Elasticity -0.08 -0.28 -0.23 -0.11 -0.27 -0.48 -0.22 -0.28
Elasticity S.E. 0.08 0.23 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.08 0.10
Observations 228 228 228 228 202 195 201 201
Huber/White/sandwich standard errors clustered at country level, t-Stats in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01;
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Table 12: Basic specification - minimum wage in time t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY
MWAW 0.94∗∗ 1.84∗∗
(2.38) (2.53)
MWAW × MWAW -1.20∗∗ -2.25∗∗
(-2.24) (-2.54)
RAMW 0.33∗∗∗ 0.17∗
(3.44) (1.83)
RAMW × RAMW -0.10∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗
(-3.52) (-2.49)
AWP -0.02 -0.00 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗
(-1.55) (-0.35) (-7.03) (-2.16)
H -0.03∗ 0.01 -0.01 -0.03∗
(-1.67) (0.60) (-0.56) (-1.71)
GRR -0.02 -0.04∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.02
(-1.38) (-4.66) (-5.64) (-1.47)
PRY -0.35 0.36 0.57 -0.08
(-0.82) (0.98) (1.37) (-0.15)
Secondary School -0.00∗∗ -0.00 -0.00 -0.00∗
(-2.05) (-1.22) (-0.76) (-1.81)
Conscription -0.01∗∗ 0.00 -0.01 -0.01∗
(-2.08) (0.03) (-0.59) (-1.71)
Bargaining 0.00 0.02∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.00
(0.37) (1.79) (2.33) (0.32)
Recession -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.00
(-1.42) (0.85) (1.62) (-0.54)
Output Gap 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.98) (-0.43) (-0.34) (0.55)
Constant -0.49∗∗ -1.20∗∗∗ -1.05∗∗∗ -0.53∗
(-2.07) (-5.40) (-6.22) (-1.82)
FE YES YES YES YES
Time effects YES NO YES NO
Country Trend NO YES NO YES
Elasticity -0.06 -0.03 -0.08 -0.19
Elasticity S.E. 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.14
Observations 231 231 231 231
Huber/White/sandwich standard errors clustered at country level, z-Stats in
parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 13: System GMM estimation
(1) (2)
EmpY EmpY
lagMWAW 5.96∗
(1.94)
lagMWAW2 -7.98∗∗
(-2.06)
lagRAMW 1.04∗∗
(2.29)
lagRAMW2 -0.28∗
(-1.84)
GRR -0.30∗∗ -0.22
(-2.18) (-1.49)
H 0.11 0.07
(1.29) (0.48)
AWP 0.22 0.03
(1.13) (0.59)
L.EmpY 0.70 -0.26
(1.04) (-0.53)
SchEn -0.00 0.01∗
(-0.97) (1.65)
PRY 9.18∗∗ 16.34∗
(2.12) (1.90)
Conscription 0.09 0.16
(0.83) (0.69)
Bargaining -0.25 0.17∗∗
(-1.04) (1.98)
Constant -2.42∗ -5.19∗∗
(-1.71) (-2.43)
Observations 228 228
No. of instr 63 66
AR(1) 0.40 0.00
AR(2) 0.94 0.10
Sargan Statistic 207.45 540.26
J-Test p-val 0.00 0.00
Standard errors clustered at country level, z-Stats
in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01; In the level equation, we use the time
effects and use the lagged output gap as IV-type
instruments and the employment rate of young in-
dividuals as a GMM-type instrument; in the first-
differenced equation, lagged differences in youth
employment are used as GMM-type instruments;
the GMM instruments have been collapsed.
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Figure 8: Time variation of the minimum wage variables (Kaitz index – red; annual minimum wage – blue),
country by country
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Table 14: Regression of the minimum wages on the instruments
(1) (2)
RAMW MWAW
Left Seats × L. OilPrice 0.23∗∗
(2.98)
L. OilPrice -0.47∗∗
(-2.09)
Left Seats × L.OilPrice 0.05∗∗∗
(5.62)
L. OilPrice 0.00
(0.80)
PRY 8.34∗∗ 0.64∗∗
(3.00) (3.49)
Secondary School 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗
(4.50) (2.69)
AWP 0.19 -0.03
(0.82) (-1.62)
H -0.01 -0.01∗∗
(-0.05) (-3.14)
Conscription 0.09 0.02∗∗
(0.78) (2.78)
Bargaining 0.15 0.02∗∗∗
(1.64) (4.33)
GRR 0.03 0.01
(0.24) (0.49)
Recession 0.19∗∗∗ 0.00
(3.55) (0.51)
Output Gap -0.01 -0.00
(-0.31) (-0.55)
Constant 3.89 -0.11
(1.89) (-0.41)
FE YES YES
Time effects YES YES
Observations 228 228
t-Stats in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 15: Results with all interaction terms – basic (Columns (1)-(4)) and IV specification (Columns (5)-(8))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lagMWAW 1.59∗∗ 1.97∗∗∗ 0.36 2.94∗
(2.35) (3.94) (0.13) (1.80)
lagMWAW × lagMWAW -2.00∗∗∗ -2.61∗∗∗ -0.76 -3.55∗
(-2.68) (-4.44) (-0.24) (-1.81)
lagRAMW 0.47∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗
(6.55) (2.86) (3.72) (2.36)
lagRAMW × lagRAMW -0.15∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗
(-7.99) (-3.98) (-5.44) (-2.58)
AWP -0.06∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.03 -0.22∗∗ -0.06 0.01 -0.02
(-1.66) (-3.71) (-1.25) (-0.79) (-2.23) (-0.49) (0.18) (-0.20)
H 0.08∗ 0.05∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.01 0.11∗∗ 0.07 0.21∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗
(1.94) (1.72) (4.66) (0.33) (2.38) (0.70) (2.59) (2.02)
GRR -0.03 -0.14∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.12 -0.03 0.04
(-0.62) (-2.62) (-2.94) (-3.37) (-0.54) (-0.56) (-0.47) (0.55)
lagMWAW × AWP 0.15 0.19∗∗ 0.41∗ 0.07
(1.47) (2.15) (1.80) (0.26)
lagMWAW × H -0.18∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ -0.20
(-2.14) (-3.38) (-3.04) (-0.83)
lagMWAW × GRR 0.02 0.25∗ 0.08 0.20
(0.21) (1.86) (0.32) (0.40)
lagRAMW × AWP -0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.03
(-1.36) (0.10) (-1.27) (-0.52)
lagRAMW × H -0.05∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.13∗∗ -0.06∗∗
(-5.57) (-2.22) (-2.25) (-2.53)
lagRAMW × GRR 0.03∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.01 -0.04
(2.04) (1.98) (0.45) (-0.90)
Secondary School -0.00∗ -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.00∗ -0.00 -0.00∗ -0.00 -0.00
(-1.68) (-2.80) (-0.40) (-1.72) (-0.71) (-1.77) (-1.55) (-1.22)
PRY 0.07 -0.18 0.55∗∗ 0.13 0.02 -0.07 0.12 1.47
(0.25) (-0.50) (2.27) (0.30) (0.05) (-0.20) (0.28) (1.13)
Conscription 0.00 -0.01∗ 0.01 -0.01∗ 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.02
(0.47) (-1.94) (1.01) (-1.69) (0.71) (-0.69) (0.21) (1.17)
Bargaining 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗∗ -0.00 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01
(2.80) (0.43) (5.08) (0.84) (3.45) (-0.20) (2.95) (1.12)
Recession 0.00 -0.00 0.01∗∗ -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.81) (-0.87) (2.48) (-0.74) (0.81) (-0.96) (-1.26) (-0.86)
Output Gap -0.00 0.00∗∗ -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00∗ -0.00 -0.00
(-0.01) (2.12) (-0.08) (1.09) (1.24) (1.72) (-0.06) (-0.90)
Constant -0.99∗∗∗ -0.67∗∗∗ -1.03∗∗∗ -0.68∗∗∗ -0.50 -0.93∗∗ -1.62∗∗∗ -1.62∗∗
(-5.53) (-3.07) (-7.30) (-2.78) (-0.55) (-2.22) (-4.06) (-2.32)
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time effects YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Country Trend NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
K-P Wald F 2.81 1.83 0.99 0.98
Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228
Huber/White/sandwich standard errors clustered at country level, t-Stats in
parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 16: Young workers – quadratic interactions – Kaitz Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY
lagMWAW 1.03∗ 0.49∗∗ 1.47∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗
(1.82) (1.97) (2.04) (3.10) (2.42) (3.12)
lagMWAW × lagMWAW -1.42∗∗ -0.84∗∗∗ -1.90∗∗ -1.71∗∗∗ -1.34∗∗ -1.26∗∗∗
(-2.14) (-2.82) (-2.25) (-4.35) (-2.12) (-2.84)
AWP 0.25∗∗ 0.03 -0.01 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.03∗∗∗
(2.50) (0.34) (-1.08) (-3.08) (-0.57) (-2.77)
H 0.01 -0.03∗∗ -0.27∗∗ -0.10 -0.00 -0.04∗∗
(0.92) (-2.31) (-2.36) (-0.96) (-0.08) (-1.98)
GRR -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.02 -0.03∗∗ -0.54∗∗∗ -0.52∗∗∗
(-2.67) (-2.04) (-1.64) (-2.23) (-7.29) (-3.13)
lagMWAW × AWP -1.44∗∗∗ -0.51
(-2.89) (-1.26)
lagMWAW × lagMWAW × AWP 2.07∗∗∗ 0.96∗
(3.43) (1.83)
lagMWAW × H 1.53∗∗∗ 0.53
(3.06) (1.16)
lagMWAW × lagMWAW × H -2.01∗∗∗ -0.85∗
(-3.76) (-1.74)
lagMWAW × GRR 2.39∗∗∗ 2.23∗∗∗
(7.51) (2.84)
lagMWAW × lagMWAW × GRR -2.73∗∗∗ -2.55∗∗∗
(-8.12) (-2.83)
Secondary School -0.00 -0.00∗∗ -0.00 -0.00∗∗ -0.00 -0.00∗∗
(-1.63) (-2.54) (-0.95) (-2.21) (-1.64) (-2.16)
PRY 0.25 -0.26 0.51∗ -0.05 0.48∗∗ 0.36
(0.88) (-0.81) (1.93) (-0.14) (2.24) (0.61)
Conscription 0.01 -0.01∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.82) (-3.23) (1.33) (-1.13) (0.31) (-1.40)
Bargaining 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00
(2.76) (0.11) (3.50) (0.77) (2.68) (0.28)
Recession 0.01∗∗ -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01∗ -0.01
(2.06) (-0.36) (1.25) (-1.28) (1.66) (-0.94)
Output Gap 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00∗ -0.00 0.00
(0.15) (1.41) (0.72) (1.73) (-0.21) (0.98)
Constant -0.87∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗ -0.93∗∗∗ -0.46∗∗ -1.07∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗
(-4.45) (-2.25) (-4.67) (-2.34) (-7.16) (-3.35)
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time effects YES NO YES NO YES NO
Country trends NO YES NO YES NO YES
Elasticity -0.19 -0.21 -0.28 -0.40 -0.01 -0.02
Elasticity S.E. (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.18)
N 228 228 228 228 228 228
Huber/White/sandwich standard errors clustered at country level, t-Stats in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
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Table 17: Young workers – quadratic interactions – Annual Minimum Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY
lagRAMW 0.33∗∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.17 0.25∗∗ 0.16
(5.86) (1.91) (7.15) (1.57) (2.54) (1.51)
lagRAMW × lagRAMW -0.11∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -0.05∗
(-8.01) (-3.01) (-7.03) (-2.20) (-2.03) (-1.65)
AWP -0.02 0.02 -0.02∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.02∗
(-0.73) (0.30) (-1.97) (-3.17) (-0.52) (-1.89)
H 0.01 -0.03 0.06∗ -0.03 -0.00 -0.04∗∗
(0.89) (-1.61) (1.81) (-0.73) (-0.50) (-2.38)
GRR -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.21∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗
(-2.66) (-1.64) (-1.48) (-1.44) (-2.61) (-4.08)
lagRAMW × AWP -0.02 -0.06
(-0.45) (-0.95)
lagRAMW × lagRAMW × AWP 0.01 0.02
(0.90) (0.98)
lagRAMW × H -0.03 0.04
(-0.61) (0.67)
lagRAMW × lagRAMW × H -0.00 -0.02
(-0.07) (-1.22)
lagRAMW × GRR 0.21∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(2.14) (3.50)
lagRAMW × lagRAMW × GRR -0.06∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗
(-2.21) (-3.39)
Secondary School -0.00 -0.00∗ -0.00 -0.00∗ -0.00 -0.00∗∗
(-0.83) (-1.87) (-0.66) (-1.79) (-1.05) (-2.05)
PRY 0.53 -0.05 0.42 0.05 0.57 0.10
(1.34) (-0.10) (1.39) (0.11) (1.49) (0.22)
Conscription 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
(0.30) (-1.47) (0.56) (-1.39) (-0.24) (-1.43)
Bargaining 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗∗ -0.00
(3.52) (0.07) (4.21) (0.71) (3.00) (-0.17)
Recession 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01∗ -0.00
(1.50) (-0.46) (1.26) (-0.85) (1.90) (-0.52)
Output Gap -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(-0.11) (0.60) (-0.26) (0.74) (-0.05) (1.02)
Constant -0.94∗∗∗ -0.48∗∗ -0.92∗∗∗ -0.43 -1.02∗∗∗ -0.56∗∗
(-6.49) (-1.98) (-6.94) (-1.51) (-7.86) (-2.39)
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time effects YES NO YES NO YES NO
Country trends NO YES NO YES NO YES
Elasticity -0.16 -0.25 -0.20 -0.22 -0.10 -0.15
Elasticity S.E. (0.15) (0.12) (0.16) (0.08) (0.14) (0.10)
N 228 228 228 228 228 228
Huber/White/sandwich standard errors clustered at country level, t-Stats in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
42
Table 18: Basic specification - Estimation with control function
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY
lagMWAW 4.19∗∗∗ 2.61∗∗
(4.27) (3.04)
lagMWAW × lagMWAW -4.65∗∗∗ -3.12∗∗
(-3.93) (-2.69)
lagRAMW 0.36∗ 0.14
(2.30) (0.95)
lagRAMW × lagRAMW -0.14∗∗ -0.07
(-2.71) (-1.84)
AWP -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04∗
(-0.35) (-1.02) (-0.83) (-1.95)
H 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
(1.58) (-0.04) (-0.57) (0.52)
GRR -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.03∗∗
(-3.88) (-2.09) (-3.12) (-2.34)
PRY 0.29 -0.16 0.84 0.05
(0.78) (-0.28) (1.72) (0.08)
Secondary School -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(-0.57) (-1.63) (0.06) (-1.34)
Conscription -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
(-0.66) (-0.13) (-0.52) (0.70)
Bargaining 0.02∗∗ -0.01 0.02∗ -0.01
(2.60) (-0.47) (2.17) (-0.62)
Recession -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00
(-0.38) (-1.51) (0.14) (-0.36)
Output Gap 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.97) (1.57) (-0.92) (0.14)
v -0.25 -0.15 0.12∗ 0.07
(-1.14) (-1.46) (2.20) (1.81)
v2 8.86∗ 9.11 -0.00 -0.65∗
(2.04) (1.61) (-0.00) (-1.90)
Constant -1.69∗∗∗ -0.92∗∗ -1.04∗∗∗ -0.48
(-4.93) (-3.21) (-3.53) (-1.23)
FE YES YES YES YES
Time effects YES NO YES NO
Country Trend NO YES NO YES
Observations 228 228 228 228
Huber/White/sandwich standard errors clustered at country level, t-Stats in
parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; v denotes the first-stage
residual
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Table 19: Basic specification - Estimation with the electoral cycle as an instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY
lagMWAW 8.25∗∗ 8.79∗∗
(2.44) (2.05)
lagMWAW × lagMWAW -8.67∗∗ -9.74∗∗
(-2.47) (-2.34)
lagRAMW 1.65∗∗ 0.74
(2.17) (0.97)
lagRAMW × lagRAMW -0.35∗∗ -0.16
(-2.52) (-0.81)
AWP 0.00 0.01 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.01
(0.15) (0.19) (-2.61) (-0.69)
H 0.04 -0.04 -0.00 0.03
(1.57) (-1.13) (-0.33) (0.92)
GRR -0.05∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗
(-5.04) (-2.73) (-5.09) (-2.32)
PRY -0.00 0.19 0.94 -1.23
(-0.00) (0.54) (1.60) (-0.95)
Secondary School -0.00 -0.00∗ -0.00 -0.00∗∗
(-1.47) (-1.86) (-1.48) (-2.35)
Conscription -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00
(-0.97) (-0.86) (-0.55) (-0.52)
Bargaining 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02
(2.72) (0.59) (2.61) (1.32)
Recession -0.01 -0.01 -0.01∗ -0.01
(-1.31) (-1.27) (-1.81) (-0.81)
Output Gap 0.01 0.00∗∗ -0.00 0.00
(1.59) (2.12) (-0.45) (1.41)
Constant -2.49∗∗∗ -2.24∗∗ -2.51∗∗ -2.50
(-3.23) (-2.23) (-2.51) (-0.52)
FE YES YES YES YES
Time effects YES NO YES NO
Country Trend NO YES NO YES
K-P Wald F 1.31 0.56 1.21 0.72
Maximal LIML Bias >25% >25% >25% >25%
Observations 228 228 228 228
Huber/White/sandwich standard errors clustered at country level, t-Stats in
parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; first-stage excluded instru-
ments: oil price interacted with the year of the electoral cycle; instruments in the
second stage: oil price interacted with the year of the electoral cycle, and squared
first-stage fitted values of the dependent variable
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